

INSURGENCY

Smrithi Nair & Srimedha Bandi
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AIM

Insurgency can be analysed as a complex affair arising out of intense ethnic and geo-political conflicts resulting in an embedded force within a country, more often than not ending up in a violent conflict against the government. It aims at disrupting and displacing the legitimacy of the government and establishing control over the resources of a given territory. Through this paper, we aim at comprehending the dynamic concept of insurgency while specifically focusing on India, especially the red corridor, the North East and Jammu & Kashmir.

BACKGROUND

India since becoming an independent Nation in 1947 has witnessed several insurgency movements which have been a major threat to India's security and Sovereignty. India is not a homogenous nation and the diversity in the population, the differences in the way different sets of populations interact with the Government and the varying levels of deprivation and injustice groups of people have felt has often given rise to violent insurgent movements which has been a recurring threat. Some of the Major insurgencies faced by India include : Jammu & Kashmir since 1980s , Assam 1979 onwards , Punjab between 1978-96, Nagaland since 1947, Tripura from 1980 onwards , Mizoram between 1966- 1976 and the Naxal Insurgency. There are certain factors which are causal to the occurrence of insurgent struggles these include : a fragmented society with a strong sense of separate social identities, inaccessibility and relative deprivation of a region or a group and often times the role played by foreign actors in supporting certain separtist ideas and ambitions also contribute to the growth of insurgency. ¹

India's Counter Insurgency Strategy (COIN) and the Counter Insurgency movement involves a struggle between the Armed Forces of the state and the insurgent forces for the support of the local population. Insurgents often depend on the Local social networks for their organisation and security and if the insurgents are believed to be supporting and representing the locally dominant grievances, they are likely to garner social support as these insurgencies do provide an alternative to the unsatisfactory law enforcement of the state.

The state on the other hand by the methods of its counterinsurgency strategies end up further alienating an already disappointed population which further limits the ability of the state to penetrate into the region and successfully eradicate the insurgencies. For example; the Application and use of draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act in Kashmir in 1990 to combat growing militancy in the region and its impact made the already disgruntled population

¹ MITRA, D. (2007). Understanding Indian Insurgencies: Implications for Counterinsurgency Operations in the Third World. Retrieved 16 September 2020, from http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:LA2r_ZhjIvQJ:publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/1849.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=in

distant from the Indian state or how the opening up of areas like the north-eastern states to outsiders results in a kind of settler colonialism which the people of the region feel erodes their culture and way of life results in further alienation and dissociation from the State.

The Insurgent struggles and the CounterInsurgency strategies employed are different from one another in terms of their causes, ambitions and methods used. However, there are also certain commonalities that effective Counterinsurgency Strategies have including maintaining the primacy of the political goals of the state, attaining the faith and trust of the disgruntled population, aiming efforts at maintaining the unity of the country and very importantly the fact that it is not the insurgents that these strategies aim to eliminate but the causes like social injustice and deprivation which forces people to turn to violent modes of rebellion. India's Counter Insurgency strategy includes both Military Centric and People Centric approaches but the failure to integrate both and at times prioritization of the former over the latter including excessive brutality of the security forces has tainted the Political outreach Programmes.

INSURGENCY AND COUNTER INSURGENCY

The Most striking single characteristic of insurgencies is their dissimilarity. It is often noted that each insurgency has a unique setting, its own causes, organisational structure, Population base, terrain and dynamics of allegiance². However this uniqueness of each insurgency doesn't diminish the common features of counter insurgency strategies. For example: In a Democracy like India, which has since its independence faced numerous insurgent struggles, the main aim of Counterinsurgency Strategies (COIN) has been to achieve the Political Goal of maintaining the unity and integrity of the Country. In Asymmetric warfares it is rather impossible to achieve a final military victory, rather effective, COIN acknowledges, and emphasizes, on the political resolution of insurgencies.

The Indian army came out with its own Manual on Sub-conventional warfare in 2006 which defines Counter Insurgency operations as involving "the use of all measures of government activity to combat insurgency, including operations by the military, central paramilitary forces, economic development, political reforms and perception management aimed at winning the 'hearts and minds' of the people". It also states that "The end state sought by a national counter-insurgency campaign is always 'conflict resolution,' which generally succeeds 'conflict termination.' This entails demilitarization of the conflict zone and shaping the environment, wherein the remaining differences can be pursued without violence. The requisite shaping of the

²Goswami, N. (2012). Counter-Insurgency Best Practices: Applicability to Northeast India | Small Wars Journal. Retrieved 16 September 2020, from <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/counter-insurgency-best-practices-applicability-to-northeast-india>

environment is affected through a concurrent application of all elements of national power. This involves addressing the root causes of the problem in right earnest".³

Rajesh Rajgopalan writing about the relatively high success rate of the counter insurgency operations of the Indian Army attribute it to five elements which are :

1. Limited use of Military force
2. Isolation of insurgents from local population
3. Achieving Domination over affected area
4. Maintenance of large forces in combat zones
5. A firm belief that there is no permanent military solution to counterinsurgency problems, which ultimately have to be resolved politically⁴

The Indian strategy has employed "Proportionate Force" and used Dialogues and Negotiations in its counter insurgency strategy. The use of force by the military and para- military forces is seen by the state as an important measure of quelling violent insurgent tactics, however the presence and the continuous engagement of the Armed forces in conflict prone areas is seen as an "occupying force"⁵ by the local population of the region. The insurgents and the Counter-insurgency strategies try to win the support of the local population and this has a huge impact on the success of either of the two movements. The state by the use of "occupation force" ends up further alienating the population in these conflict prone zones, which makes the penetration of the Counter-Insurgency strategies difficult in these regions but the goal of an effective counterinsurgency strategy is not to eliminate the insurgents but to neutralize them and attain the support of the local population and achieve the goal of maintaining the unity and integrity of the nation.

The Indian state treats insurgency as a law and order issue which is under purview of the state but in quelling insurgencies the centre also is a very important stakeholder and the success of any Counterinsurgency strategy necessarily depends on the level of collaboration and coordination amongst these actors. There has also been a significant difference in the way the state has dealt with insurgencies depending on whether the movement has secessionist ambitions or not. Thus, the Counter- Insurgency strategies used against Naxal insurgency is thus different from the strategies used in Jammu & Kashmir and in the North-east.

³Chakrabarti, S. (2010). Evolving Insurgency and India's Counter-Insurgency Options: Entering into the Age of Fourth-Generation Warfare?. *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 09(2), 65-78. doi: 10.11610/connections.09.2.05

⁴Rajagopalan, R. (2007). Force and Compromise: India's Counter-Insurgency Grand Strategy. *South Asia: Journal Of South Asian Studies*, 30(1), 75-91. doi: 10.1080/00856400701264035

⁵Chakrabarti, S. (2010). Evolving Insurgency and India's Counter-Insurgency Options: Entering into the Age of Fourth-Generation Warfare?. *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 09(2), 65-78. doi: 10.11610/connections.09.2.05

THE CASE OF THE “RED CORRIDOR”

The Maoist insurgency in India follows a long history of peasant and tribal rebellion against predatory state structures on the subcontinent. It originated in its present form in a small village in Naxalbari, West Bengal, where in 1967, villagers armed with bows and arrows resisted police and feudal landlords. The rebellion was quelled by the police in a matter of a few days but it led to growth of the Naxalite movement led by Charu Majumdar and his close associates, Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal. Charu Majumdar was arrested in 1972 and he died in Police custody but that wasn't the end of the armed militancy.⁶ The movement eventually spread across a vast geographical area affecting as many as 200 districts in its peak due to which the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh referred to Naxal insurgency as the “single biggest internal-security challenge ever faced by our country”.

The Major driving force behind this movement and its growth was the existence of “Two Indias side by side”. Post liberalisation India was rapidly Modernising and at the same time the gap of inequality was also skyrocketing. However the economic grievances were not enough for movement to gain ground; the Naxal movements and its tactics gained legitimacy in areas of the country which faced extreme deprivation and what triggers these acts of violent rebellion are flash points of injustices.⁷

The Red Corridor is the area demarcated by the union Government which is affected by Naxalism and in April 2018 the union government updated the areas that fall under the red corridor. According to the updated classification 90 districts and 11 states were affected by Naxalism.⁸ The updated list removing 44 districts from the worst hit areas by Left-wing extremism and also according to its statistics the incidents of Left wing extremism had declined 60% from 2,258 in 2009 to 908 in 2017, however casualties among security forces in left-wing extremism-hit areas increased by 27%, from 59 in 2015 to 75 in 2017, including 35 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel who were killed by the Naxalites in April 2017.⁹

⁶ Sahoo, N. (2019). Half a century of India's Maoist insurgency: An appraisal of state response | ORF. Retrieved 16 September 2020, from <https://www.orfonline.org/research/half-a-century-of-indias-maoist-insurgency-an-appraisal-of-state-response-51933/>

⁷ Vira, V. (2011). Counterinsurgency in India: The Maoists | Small Wars Journal. Retrieved 16 September 2020, from <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/counterinsurgency-in-india-the-maoists>

⁸ Tripathi, R. (2018). The contours of the new Red map. Retrieved 16 September 2020, from <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/naxalism-maoist-attacks-home-ministry-modi-govt-national-policy-and-action-plan-5140028/>

⁹ Das, S. (2020). Four years of Modi govt: Naxals find their stronghold shrinking. Retrieved 16 September 2020, from <https://www.livemint.com/Politics/R542igaS9NWU5XyIBTfpnI/Four-years-of-Modi-govt-Naxals-find-their-stronghold-shrink.html>

The Counter insurgency strategy in response to Naxal insurgency of various states have varied as they are mainly managed by the state administrations but alongside state specific operations the federal government has been involved in Joint strategies.

The Counter-Insurgency Strategy can be majorly grouped into two parts:

Those initiatives which attempt to bring about law and order stability in the Conflict prone regions:

- This includes the Modernisation of Police forces the Centre and states Governments collaborated to strengthen and improve the quality of policing in Maoist affected areas. Several Police Modernisation schemes were implemented in these states. The Centre channeled substantial sums of funds to aid states in modernising and upgrading their police forces in terms of acquiring modern weaponry, communication equipment, mobility, and infrastructure. Along with the deployment of Paramilitary forces like the Commando Battalion (CoBRA) that are equipped and trained in guerilla and jungle warfare techniques. Andhra Pradesh used a special Force called the Greyhounds from 2004-2007 to eliminate Maoist leaders.¹⁰
- It also included strengthening of intelligence networks : The Centre, in close consultation with states, then took certain critical steps to strengthen and upgrade the capabilities of intelligence agencies. This includes round-the-clock intelligence-sharing through Multi Agency Centre (MAC) at the Central level and through State Multi Agency Centre (SMAC) at the State level. Other noteworthy steps include the setting up of a Joint Command and Control Centre at Maoist hotbeds such as Jagdalpur and Gaya.¹¹
- Security Related Expenditure was implemented this scheme allowed state governments to reimburse 50 percent of their expenses on provisions like insurance scheme for police personnel, community policing, rehabilitation of surrendered Maoists, other security-related items.¹²

¹⁰ Big crackdown against Maoists' 'overground' supporters planned. (2018). Retrieved 16 September 2020, from <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/big-crackdown-against-maoists-overground-supporters-planned/articleshow/65654346.cms>

¹¹ Sahoo, N. (2019). Half a century of India's Maoist insurgency: An appraisal of state response | ORE. Retrieved 16 September 2020, from <https://www.orfonline.org/research/half-a-century-of-indias-maoist-insurgency-an-appraisal-of-state-response-51933/>

¹² Sahoo, N. (2019). Half a century of India's Maoist insurgency: An appraisal of state response | ORE. Retrieved 16 September 2020, from <https://www.orfonline.org/research/half-a-century-of-indias-maoist-insurgency-an-appraisal-of-state-response-51933/>

- Security related Infrastructural developments were also made which gave Security forces access to earlier impenetrable areas. More than 250 Fortified Police stations were opened.¹³
- The Central government in 2009 put a country-wide ban on CPI (Maoist) and the government enacted the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.

Alongside these efforts centred on the use of Force, **Population Centric approach also has been very important for Counterinsurgency Strategies in Naxal affected areas.** Winning the hearts and minds of the local population who support the Armed rebellion has been necessary without which it is not possible to have an effective Strategy. In all the states affected by Naxalism there has been a clear inclination towards ensuring good governance and development. For Instance in Andhra Pradesh Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy introduced various socio-economic programmes. *Indiramma* introduced in 2006, was part of the same, sought to cover every village *panchayat* in three years and provide what the state has not in decades, including healthcare, education, clean drinking water, *pucca* houses with sanitation facilities, electricity connection, and roads. There are several other Policies in other states, like the connectivity projects which included construction of 11 Roads in Chhattisgarh, or the attempt to strengthen the Public Distribution system of Bihar under Nitish Kumar, the three-pronged approach by Mamta Banerjee's Government in West Bengal. First, the government overhauled the security strategy by setting up an elite police team to pursue the rebel leaders. Second, they offered a surrender and rehabilitation package to the rebels, promising jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities to those who would surrender. Third and perhaps most critical element of the campaign was in the form of comprehensive confidence-building measures with the people living in the Maoist-infested areas. The Surrender and Rehabilitation packages were made attractive so as to incentivise as many insurgents as possible to give up arms and join the 'mainstream society'. States like Jharkhand and Orissa have offered huge incentives to the Naxals who surrender themselves. Further, the government has offered cash equivalent to the price of the weapon surrendered. They will provide them with life insurance cover, vocational training, agricultural land, health and 47 educational facilities for their children. The UPA Government launched the "Integrative Action Plan" to implement a special scheme which addresses the development deficiencies in LWE-affected districts; the financial package was over INR 6,000 crore per annum. While the NDA government disbanded the IAP scheme, it came with its own scheme called Special Central Assistance (SCA) to cover 35 most LWE-affected districts.¹⁴

¹³ (2017). Retrieved 16 September 2020, from <http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20Home%20Affairs/201.pdf>

¹⁴ Sahoo, N. (2019). Half a century of India's Maoist insurgency: An appraisal of state response | ORF. Retrieved 16 September 2020, from <https://www.orfonline.org/research/half-a-century-of-indias-maoist-insurgency-an-appraisal-of-state-response-51933/>

The main aim of these People-Centric approaches has been to address the two out of the three main driving forces behind insurgencies, them being the sense of relative deprivation that people face due to encountering constant injustices and the inaccessibility and alienation faced by people in an isolated region. These schemes which aim at eradicating deprivation move beyond mere Social Inclusion and are aimed at Social Justice .

The Naxal Movement came into being as a result of existing social and economic conditions and its sustenance and spread was also fueled by the Caste and Class tensions and sense of deprivation and desperation due to socio-economic conditions. This movement attracted people from the oppressed sections of the society like the tribals who were alienated from their lands and tribal and agricultural labourers. Thus, the People-centric approach aimed at social reform and integration is what is necessary to address the causes of the rebellion as the aim of an effective Counter insurgency Strategy is not to eliminate the insurgents but the causes of the same. Use of Disproportionate force is likely to do more harm than good as it further contributes to alienating the population, the Government needs to instill faith in the people not fear. However, given the bloody history of the insurgency and Counterinsurgency struggles it is rather difficult to transcend to a participatory system which further emphasizes the need to carefully design and conduct Military missions so as to minimize civilian alienation, address the grievances of the aggrieved population and serve the cause of social justice.

THE CASE OF THE NORTH EAST

Cradled by the unfathomed wilderness of the Himalayas, is the North Eastern region encompassing 7 sister states and a brother whose strategic, political and economic significance is not unknown. Home to India's diversity, this region has faced a profuse series of insurgencies since independence, beginning with the Naga insurgency. A result of unprecedented mismanagement of the implementation of recommendations made by the Bordoloi Sub-committee¹⁵ had given rise to tribal insurgencies across the middle east, which is now commonly known as the Naga insurgency and often proclaimed as the 'Mother of all insurgencies'. Although there doesn't seem to be a well versed solution to this issue, consistent ceasefires have mitigated and contained the insurgency. The foundations of the insurgency were formed when the Naga Club (which was an initiative to unite Naga tribes in 1918) rejected the Simon Commission and stressed on self determination. Renamed as the Naga National Council¹⁶

¹⁵Thapliyal, Sheru. Insurgency in The Northeast: Is there Light at the End of the Tunnel. Indian Defence Review Retrieved 17 December 2018 from <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/insurgency-in-the-northeast-is-there-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel/>

¹⁶Sinha, SP. Nagaland: The Beginning of Insurgency - I. Indian Defence Review Retrieved 9 May 2011 from <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/nagaland-the-beginning-of-insurgency-i/2/>

(NNC) in 1946, under the leadership of Angami Zapu Phizo it declared Nagaland as an independent State on August 14, 1947 following which Assam's governor signed the Nine-Point Agreement with the NNC excluding Phizo which was instantly rejected by him. The NNC then held a "referendum" in May 1951 to claim that 99.9% of the Nagas supported a "sovereign Nagaland" and for this sole purpose of sovereignty led to the establishment of the underground Naga Federal Government (NFG) and the Naga Federal Army by Phizo. The Government dealt with this uprising with the use of force and enacted the AFSPA in 1958. Post a 16 point agreement between the Naga People's Convention and the Government of India the formation of Nagaland took place in 1963. The NNC reacted to this by delving into a violent path leading to a Peace Mission which was eventually rejected after 6 rounds of talks in 1967. Later in 1975 the government signed the Shillong Accord¹⁷, under which the NNC and NFG agreed to give up arms however a faction of people refused to accept the Shillong Accord and formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland in 1980 which later split into NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) following a violent clash in 1988¹⁸; this resulted in subsiding the significance of the NNC and the rise of both the factions of NSCN. The struggle which began with ethnographic differences spearheaded by the NNC demanding the "right to develop themselves according to their freely expressed wishes" continue to exist but now being lead by the NSCN who initially demanded for a "Greater Nagalim" comprising "all contiguous Naga-inhabited areas", along with Nagaland which now toned down to greater autonomy within the constitutional framework with due regard to the uniqueness of Naga history and traditions.

Mizoram on the other hand experienced militancy following the union governments' failure to provide timely and adequate assistance during the "Mautam famine". Angered by this, the Mizo's formed the Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF) to help out the victims. The MNFF headed by Laldenga, a former Indian army soldier from the Mizo tribe, organised it into a platform supporting rebellion against the Government following which the army intervened. Peace was later established in 1987 after Mizoram was carved out of Assam thus resulting in the dissemination of the MNFF.

Manipur with its diverse ethnic communities presents a novel set of demands. The Nagas of the Manipur Hills align their demands with the NSCN; the Meitei youth of Manipur forming 60%

¹⁷ Bhaumik, Subir. Insurgencies in India's Northeast: Conflict, Cooption & Change. East west centre Washington Retrieved 10 July 2007 from <https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/3540/EWCWwp010.pdf>

¹⁸ Kumar, Sanjay. The origins and Causes of Insurgency in north east india. The Geopolitics Retrieved 3 May 2018 from <https://thegeopolitics.com/the-origins-and-causes-of-insurgency-in-northeast-india/>

of the population on the other hand formed the United National Liberation Front (UNLF)¹⁹ in 1964 (which is proclaimed to be the strongest separatist group), Revolutionary People's Front, the People's Liberation Army in 1976, Kanglei Kana Yan Lup (playing the role of a moral cop), the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and the Kangleipak* Communist Party (KCP) which have been subsumed over time. Other ethnic tribes like the Kukis, the Paites and Zomis²⁰ also have counter organisations which more often than not fight against the Metei's. The Metei's are strongly against endemic corruption and aim at reforming the society.

Tripura, known for its indigenous tribes has faced the issue of illegal immigrants since 1947 resulting in the dwindling of the local tribes into a minority. Consistent clashes between the Illegal migrants and the tribals is the root cause of insurgency which resulted in the formation of Tribal National Volunteers (TNV²¹) in 1978 who attacked the illegal settlers. Alongside the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)²² and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) continues to fight against the marginalisation through arms. Although the TNV signed the Tripura Peace Accord in 1988, peace yet seems to be far from the horizon.

Assam's insurgency took birth with the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) along with the All Assam Students Union (AASU)²³ in 1979 which was an agitation parallel to the one faced by Tripura. They fought against the massive influx of migrants following Bangladesh's independence. After a series of chaos and bloodshed, in 1985, AASU signed an agreement with the GOI to put an end to the agitation. Taking AASU as inspiration, an alternate militant group: United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) took birth, which wasn't limited to Assam but spread to subsequent states: Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya.

¹⁹ Sarangthem, Bobby. Guide to the Indian Army (East) Indian Army from <https://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTemplate/frnTempSimple.aspx?MnId=uFaJJPLei/pe8JOA8nmhAg==&ParentID=vdmVQITacHNOOS7c3DYU7A==>

²⁰ Early solution to insurgency problem in Manipur difficult: Army. Economic times Retrieved 5 November 2018 from <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/early-solution-to-insurgency-problem-in-manipur-difficult-army/articleshow/66497090.cms?from=mdr>

²¹ Thapliyal, Sheru. Insurgency in The Northeast: Is there Light at the End of the Tunnel. Indian Defence Review Retrieved 17 December 2018 from <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/insurgency-in-the-northeast-is-there-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel/>

²² ATTF, South Asia Terrorism Portal Retrieved 11 September 2020 from https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/tripura/terrorist_outfits/attf.htm

²³ Thapliyal, Sheru. Insurgency in The Northeast: Is there Light at the End of the Tunnel. Indian Defence Review Retrieved 17 December 2018 from <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/insurgency-in-the-northeast-is-there-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel/>

Arunachal Pradesh on the other hand which is comparatively a better home to peace has also faced limited uprisings which has resulted in the formation of Arunachal Dragon Force (ADF), which was renamed as the East India Liberation Front (EALF)²⁴ in 2001, strives to protect the ethnic identity of the indigenous people.

The North East, although connected by a thin stretch of 22 km proclaimed as the Siliguri corridor, seems to be insulated from the rest of the country's socio-economic development. The inefficiency and mismanagement on the Governments' end has resulted in unprecedented strife and turmoil in this scenic paradise. Despite India being a diverse country the north east seems to be taciturn towards believing that the Indian Constitution will preserve its vivid ethnicity. Citizens also seem to develop a feeling of deprivation, isolation and exploitation compelling²⁵ them to take up alternate means such as armed conflict in order to draw attention and instil development. Not different from other insurgencies, the North Eastern insurgency area also houses five actors: society, insurgents, administration, politicians and security forces. The Administration and the Politicians who play a major role in moulding the future of this region have more or less dealt their demands with force and by providing the Security Forces an unequivocal and unchecked access which has resulted in excesses that have gone unaddressed. The policies developed by the Centre like the AFSPA²⁶ have further deepened these fears. The AFSPA was formulated to give the armed forces the power to maintain public order in "disturbed areas" by bestowing upon them the capacity to fire or kill any person indulging in contravention of law or carrying any weapons, if in his/her opinion, the situation warrants such action; which in many cases has resulted in exacerbating the alienation, undermining the excesses and ignoring accountability. The absence of effective governance has forced the government to deploy security forces in this region and has also resulted in the diversion of funds into the hands of the insurgent groups who have given up their ideologies and are indulging in large scale extortions. The government thus needs to step up its game and address this issue with effective governance by altering the political process instead of imposing uninhibited draconian laws which are backed by the constitution in a democratic set-up like ours.

²⁴ ADF Arunachal Dragon Force, EILF East India Liberation Front. Global Security Org retrieved 26 August 2020 from <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hnlc.htm>

²⁵ Bhardwaj, Kulbushan. Insurgency in North East India : Genesis and Prognosis. USI journal Retrieved April-June 2016 from <https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/insurgency-in-north-east-india-genesis-and-prognosis/>

²⁶ Vohra, Dewan C. Special Powers act Not a solution, Financial Express Retrieved 19 July 2007 from <https://www.financialexpress.com/archive/special-powers-act-not-a-solution/205512/>

THE CASE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

Jammu and Kashmir has been a breeding ground for separatist ambitions and insurgent struggles since time immemorial. Following the partition of India which resulted in the formation of polar opposites: India and Pakistan; and Jammu and Kashmir which remained neutral initially but was forced to side with one of the countries. Choosing to side with India, after being provided a special provision under article 370, despite its muslim dominated population, J&K became a home to powerful elements, more often than not determined by the Islamic Republic²⁷. India further added fuel to the fire by tampering with the state elections in 1987. Visible loss of autonomy which was promised by the constitution culminated in the insurgent struggles led by the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) which demanded independence. Pakistan's consistent supply of equipment hastened the process. Instead of being termed as an insurgency, it began taking the shape of unconventional warfare and terrorism. Despite taking up this issue at an international forum, the insurgent nature of the issue resulted in giving a free ride to Pakistan.²⁸ The insurgency resulted in the birth of Islamic militant groups who influenced civilians through indoctrination and are now behind a majority of the attacks on civilians. Organisations like the The JKLF, demanding for the unification of the Indian and Pakistani sides of Kashmir and independence for all of Kashmir, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, demanding unification with Pakistan, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), an organisation of religious radicals aiming at disrupting India and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), whose main aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan. The involvement of the Pakistan Government, through infiltrators and supply of arms, along with the air surrounding accession of J&K coupled with the governments' inefficiency have been a bane to this white landscape²⁹. The Indian government launched a series of counter-insurgency³⁰ operations: Operation Rakshak in 1990, Operation Sarp Vinash in 2003, Operation Calm Down in 2016, Operation All Out in 2017 and Operation Sadbhavna; it has

²⁷ Ministry of External Affairs. Retrieved 19 January, 2004 from https://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/19156_Kashmir_The_True_Story_19-01-2004.pdf

²⁸ Marks, Thomas A. Jammu & Kashmir: State Response to Insurgency - The Case of Jammu. SATP Retrieved 30 September 2020 from <https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume16/article1.htm>

²⁹ Pillai, GK. Ask an Expert, Insurgency in Kashmir | Retrieved 17 February 2012 from <https://idsa.in/askanexpert/insurgencyinKashmir%26Northeast>

³⁰ Sharda, Pooja. Indian Army Operations in Jammu and Kashmir. Abhipedia from <https://abhipedia.abhimanu.com/Article/State/MTQ3Mzk1/Indian-Army-operations-in-Jammu-and-Kashmir-Jammu-and-kashmir-State>

also abrogated article 370 and imposed AFSPA and UAPA in the disturbed areas yet peace seems to be found nowhere.

CONCLUSION

India has experienced various violent insurgent uprisings since its inception in 1947. Counterinsurgency strategies have been defined as “the use of all measures of government activity to combat insurgency, including operations by the military, central paramilitary forces, economic development, political reforms and perception management aimed at winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people”..

As Jones³¹ writes that insurgency is essentially established on four main pillars:

The first are insurgents, those hoping to overthrow the established government or secede from it. The second is the local government, which includes the government’s security forces, the army and police, as well as key national and local political institutions. The third group consists of outside actors: external states and other nonstate [sic] entities, which might support either side. Finally, the local population is the most important group; it is for their hearts and minds that the war is being fought in the first place (Jones, 2009 a p. 152 – 153).

In conflict torn areas both the insurgents and the state are usually embroiled in a struggle to win the support of the population, however the use of disproportionate and excessive force by the state is often seen as “occupying force” by the local population which augments alienation. The attempts at political dialogue and negotiations are often tainted by this excessive use of force. More often than not the government also encourages settler colonialism to cash on the untapped resources of these regions which further instigates the population and pushes them further away from the administration.

An Effective Counterinsurgency strategy thus necessarily involves the understanding that its aim is not eliminate the “insurgents” but to neutralize them and redress the grievances and causes which led to or triggered armed rebellion.

³¹ Lacey, B. (2015). Investigating insurgency and counter insurgency and attaining a monopoly on violence. Edith Cowen University Retrieved 2015 from https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses_hons/386

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